TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF TEMPO NEWS MAGAZINE
REPRESENTATION OF TERRORISM

Prayudi
Jurusan Ilmu Komunikasi FISIP UPN “Veteran” Yogyakarta
Jl. Babarsari No. 2 Tambakbayan Yogyakarta 55282, Telp. (0274) 485268
HP. 0815 680 1807 / e-mail: yudhi_ahmad@yahoo.com

Abstract
Penelitian menganalisis ini bagaimana media berita Indonesia merepresentasikan isu terorisme dalam konteks Indonesia. Representasi peristiwa di media merupakan hasil dari proses yang kompleks dalam institusi media berita. Upaya institusi media berita merepresentasikan realita meliputi teknologi untuk menghasilkan dan mendistribusikan teks; institusi di mana teknologi dibentuk dan dikendalikan untuk produksi teks; dan bentuk-bentuk kultural yang berhubungan dengan strukturasi produk teknologi media dan organisasi; bagaimana bahasa dan makna disusun ke dalam kode. Lebih jauh, institusi media berita harus pula mempertimbangkan konteks politik dan kultural dari peristiwa yang terjadi. Sehubungan dengan hal ini, isu kontroversial dan penting seperti serangan teroris dan perang internasional terhadap terror dikelola dan direpresentasikan sesuai dengan kebijakan internal organisasi media dengan mempertimbangkan kondisi aspek kultural dan politik. Media berita yang menjadi objek penelitian ini adalah majalah berita Tempo.

Keywords: Indonesian press, terrorism and Islam

Introduction
The representation of terrorism in Indonesian news media is very much influenced by the rise of civil society in which citizens are given the opportunity to express their interests, needs and ideas, and to achieve their mutual goals in order to consolidate a sense of collective destiny and a “civil” society. The condition has created opportunities for new political parties and social groups like Muslim organisations to appear. It has also driven the new idea of freedom of the press in Indonesia. The press becomes more critical in reporting an issue. News media policies also experience significant changes. Under the New Order authoritarian press system, the government determined media and editorial policies. They were required to be congruent with government communication policy. However, post New Order conditions Meanwhile, and in a more libertarian press system, the owners and professional editors are free to determine their own policies in accordance with a democratically formed regulatory regime. Government communication policy only regulates the press in order to ensure they obey codes of ethics and law. To this extent, controversial and highly significant events like the recent terrorist attacks and the international “war on terror” are managed and represented according to the internal policies of the news media organizations, rather than the directives of government. The news media, however, still need to consider cultural, political and industrial contexts that come from outside the news media institutions.

This research analyses Tempo representation of terrorism. With libertarian and critical reporting style, Tempo has become a leading news magazine in Indonesia. Even after the banning of this magazine in 1994 by the New Order regime for four years, Tempo was able to gain its reputation as the leading news magazine when made its return in 1998. Therefore, to look at how it represents the news on terrorism in Indonesia is inter-
isting in terms of media-government and Islam-terrorism relationships. The complexity of the news representation was also analysed in relation to the dynamic of political changes that occurred in the era of ‘reform’ and industrial context that may affect editorial policy.

Analytically, the study investigates how the Indonesia news media represent the issue of terrorism. The representation of terrorism in the Indonesian news media is the result of a complex construction process which incorporates cultural, political economic and industrial factors. The video disc that recorded the confession of the suicide bombers who committed the 2005 Bali bombing were broadcasted on global television networks. As with many other terrorist attacks, the terrorist strategy of promoting and communicating causes is clearly illustrated in the broadcast. As Walter Lacqueuer (1987, 1993) has noted, terrorism in this sense is fundamentally a communication event. The ways in which the media represent the issue, then, plays a significant role in shaping how people think about the issue (Chomsky, 2001, Lewis, 2005). At the same time, the news media has to consider various factors in reporting the issue as terrorism is a sensitive and potentially divisive issue. It is then interesting to analyse how different Indonesian news media represent issues of terrorism within an Indonesian context.

Mainly, this research is comprised into two sections. First section outlines the profile and editorial policy of Tempo news magazine. The discussion of the profile of Tempo is pertinent to give the historical background of the news media institution that had affected Tempo’s editorial policy in representing news on terrorism. Further, the research outlines how the meaning of news representation of issue of terrorism in Tempo news magazine has been constructed.

**Tempo: the Profile and Editorial Policy**

**The Profile**

Tempo was first established in the form of magazine in 1971 by some young journalists: Goenawan Mohamad, Fikri Jufri, Bur Rasuantu, Christiano Wibisono, Yusril Djalinus and Putu Wijaya. Tempo’s vision was to become the guidance in the process of enhancing people’s freedom of thought and expression and to build society that appreciates smartness and difference of opinion. Published in the New Order era, Tempo’s professional practice of journalism gained high appreciation from its readers, but was disliked by the regime due to its critical reporting style. Phone calls and warning either from the state or military agencies were common during this period. As editor-in-chief of Tempo, Bambang Harymurti, said, “A staffer’s conviction to a story may often be challenged, but never crushed. If a story deserves to be told, it will be printed regardless of the consequences” (Company profile of Tempo, 2006). It did not take long time for Tempo to become a respective news weekly magazine.

Tempo’s critical and libertarian reportage, however, had resulted in the banning of the magazine twice during Suharto’s New Order (1982 and 1994). The first banning (nearly for two months) was employed due to Tempo’s reportage on the issue of unrest in the Golongan Karya campaign. This magazine was considered to have spread hatred among supporters of this Suharto’s political vehicle. The second banning, as has been discussed in research 6, relates to the reportage of the buying of 39 ex German warship for Indonesian Navy. Tempo had been considered to have played between Financial Minister, Mar’ie Muhammad against Minister of Research and Technology, Habibie. The last banning, along with the banned of two other news media, had triggered protests from the banned news media journalists and employees, students as well as academicians.

Whilst lodging a lawsuit to the state court against Minister of Information policy, some ex Tempo journalists continued its journalistic work via virtual world. Since 1996, Tempo’s news online portal was launched for the first time through its web address www.Tempointeraktif.com. This strategy was brilliant in relation to struggle for the freedom of the press as well as to continue Tempo’s vision to become the guidance for freedom of expression. It was made possible as the government was not aware of the power of virtual world and therefore gave less attention to this issue (see Sen & Hill, 2000).

At the end of Suharto’s regime, the maga-
azine made its return on 6 October 1998 and gained its popularity. In order to expand its readers and go international, Tempo launched its Japanese edition of Tempo Interactive in July 2000 and English edition of Tempo magazine on 12 September 2000. To fulfil the need of its readers for daily news, the editorial board of Tempo published Koran Tempo (Tempo Newsresearch) on 21 April 2001 with its general objective to report news critically and in the ‘liberal’ tradition, which informs the western democratic Fourth Estate model. As part of its commitment to become an independent news media institution, PT Tempo Inti Media tbk., which publishes the magazine, allows its employees and public to own the company’s share so that no parties are dominant and may endanger Tempo’s editorial policies.

First published in 1971 with 20,000 copies, Tempo’s circulation has now reached 300,000 copies, which is quite high for Indonesian media industry. In relation to this issue, Tempo’s senior editor, Goenawan Mohammad, gave his comment:

There was no miracle responsible for our current readership numbers. Today Tempo is the most read publication of its kind. Tempo’s story of survival and success has something to do with its constant efforts to be highly reliable, both as a news organization and a business enterprise.

Most of Tempo’s readers come from higher educational background. It is well known among its readers and society to be one of credible news sources.

Since made its return on 29 September 1998, Tempo’s name cannot be separated from weekly news magazine that is independent and presents news with professional journalistic standard. Supported with three decades of experience, Tempo always becomes a leader in its field. Actuality, in-depth and accuracy in reporting will always become Tempo’s characteristic.

Editorial Policy

Tempo news magazine employed editorial policy where it refused any interference from any parties. Its critical and libertarian reportage have become strong characteristics of this magazine. Its form as a magazine has made it possible for Tempo to employ in-depth reporting style. The editorial board of Tempo realized that in term of timeliness, magazine was less fast than newsresearch that daily published; and adopting in-depth reporting was a way to deal with this situation.

To adjust with the news magazine format, Tempo adopts feature writing style with the combination of soft news and feature stories writing. This writing style has become a characteristic of Tempo with the purpose to reach wider audience and to involve them with the stories they read. Mary Gillespie, feature writer of Chicago Sun-Times, said,

News writers love the rush they get when they run out and cover a breaking news story. Meanwhile a feature involves readers on the level of “This could happen to you”. You are teaching people something about themselves (in Itule & Anderson 2003, p. 124).

As the consequence of the adoption of this writing technique and in an attempt to influence public, Tempo frequently uses figurative language (symbolism, metaphor) and three forms of persuasion: ethos (credibility), pathos (emotion) and logos (argument).

Tempo has a principle that public will only trust the media if it acts accordingly and responsibly, which are simply to be professional. Within the context of recent terrorist attacks, Tempo principally adopted fair, check and balance, and cover both sides’ principles. For instance, as further discussed in the next section, it appeared in the form of the reportage of Pesantren Al-Islam, Ngruki. Despite high coverage of the accusation of the radical teachings of this pesantren and the relation of some of its alumni with some terrorism events as reported by western news media, Tempo professionally stayed neutral from the debate. Bambang Harymurti, editor-in-chief of Tempo commented, “Tempo is also known in the industry for its ability to harness the creative energies of its staff within an environment of mutual respect, professionalism, and journalistic independence.” Within Tempo’s perspective, public deserves the right to interpret the news freely. As Stuart Allan says, “Journalism is charged with the crucial mis-
sion of ensuring that members of the public are able to draw upon a diverse ‘market place of ideas’ to both sustain and challenge their sense of the world around them” (2000, p.49).

The same policy was also employed by Tempo in reporting how the government managed terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Despite a long history where the magazine was ever banned twice by the government, Tempo attempted to stay neutral in reporting this issue. If it thought that the government had done nothing or tended to be slow to overcome the issue, it would criticize the government. On the other hand, Tempo gave credit to government or security authority when it was able to capture the suspected perpetrators. This was evident in the case of the capture of Imam Samudra, one of the 2002 Bali bombing perpetrators. In its No. 39/XXXI/25 Nov-1 Dec 2002 edition, Tempo used most of police news sources to describe the arresting process of Imam Samudra and in the end gave compliment to the police, although at the same time remained it not to easily satisfy.

Tempo was aware of its position as the leading news magazine in Indonesia which placed it at the centre of public life. To Tempo news magazine, it was its responsibility for giving expression to a richly pluralistic spectrum of information sources that helped constructing the context for the public to make judgement of the terrorism events. Thus, there was no need for the media to take aside except to the interest of the public. This principle is in accordance with Tempo’s vision to be “a guide in the process of enhancing society’s freedom to think and to express their opinion as well as developing society that appreciates intelligence and opinion difference”.

Within the above understanding, certain issues like the relationship between Islam and terrorism in Indonesia and how the Indonesian government dealt with terrorism had become big concern to Tempo. The analysis of Tempo’s representation of terrorism is examined in detail in the next section. It is focused on how the meaning of issue of terrorism is presented and constructed in Tempo news magazine. Further, it is examined within cultural, political, and industrial contexts.

**Tempo Representation of Terrorism**

Terrorism has always been an issue with high news value to news media institution. In Indonesia, this issue increases as the perpetrators of terrorism have used religion to legitimize their acts of terror. As Hoffman said, the combination of religion and terrorism can be cited as one of the main reasons for terrorism’s increased lethality. The fact that for the religious terrorist violence inevitably assumes a transcendent purpose and therefore becomes a sacramental or divine duty, arguably results in a significant loosening of the constraints on the commission of mass murder (1995, p. 280).

With terrorism events such as the 2002 Bali bombing, the 2003 JW Marriott hotel and the 2004 Australian Embassy bombings in Indonesia, which have claimed hundreds of lives, have been associated with Islam in the country, and have damaged the Indonesian reputation in the international world, it is unlikely that the news media would ignore the issue. Nonetheless, how the news media institutions represent the issue is interesting to analyse.

The representation of the three terrorism events in Tempo news magazine is interesting in relation to the cultural, political as well as industrial contexts. Tempo has a long history as a leading news magazine that reports news critically and in the “liberal” tradition, which informs the western democratic Fourth Estate model. Its relation with government, especially in the New Order era, with two banning, proofs how this news magazine will report the news that are considered important to public regardless of the consequences. And terrorism is one among other issues that are considered important for the public to know. Thus, Tempo felt it was necessary to report the issue as part of its responsibility to public.

**Tempo** is widely known with its in-depth reporting style. In the case of the 2002 Bali bombing for instance, more than tens of Tempo’s news magazine editions were dedicated to report the development of terrorism in Indonesia that had been associated with Islam. Meanwhile, more than tens of journalists were involved in the data and
news gathering to give solid, actual and reliable information to public.

Principally, Tempo tended to represent the issue through cultural and political perspectives. Based on these perspectives, it gave special attention to the following issues: (i) the investigation process conducted by the police, and (ii) disclosure of the terrorist network. This is signified by the intense reporting of all the issues above. In particular, Tempo gave high attention to the third issue. Why did Tempo focus on these two issues?

Tempo felt it was necessary to seriously report the issue of terrorism based on some arguments. First, after the 9/11 attack toward the United States, there has been global misperception where Islam has been identified as a religion that teaches violence. Something, according to Tempo, needs to be clarified. Secondly, Tempo felt it was its obligation to do news investigation in order to find the ‘truth’ about how there were radical groups that justified their acts of terror in the name of Islam. This issue had become special attention to Tempo as part of its social control in representing news on the teachings of Islam so that there wouldn’t be any disputes within society, considering the fact that Muslims are dominant within the country. The analyses of the representations of the issues above are divided into sub headings to make it easier to understand.

The Investigation Process Conducted by the Police

The first issue that relates to political perspective is how the police conducted the investigation process. The representation of this issue had been a big concern to Tempo as terrorist attacks nearly occurred every year since the year 2000. In each reporting of the three events, there were always several news features that specifically dealt with the issue, or the investigation process always included in one among other issues in the main news features. Nonetheless, unlike the Jakarta Post daily in which issued editorials that principally blamed intelligence for not acting as an early warning system; Tempo tried to be fair in reporting the issue. Tempo gave credit to the police if it had been able to identify and capture the perpetrators of the acts of terror, but criticised it when failed to do so. This is interesting considering the fact that Tempo had been banned twice and received several warnings from the government. This can be proof of professional and reliable journalistic practice as Goenawan Muhhand said in his interview.

Besides reporting the investigation process, Tempo also gave attention to issues of conflict between police and military, and lack of coordination among intelligence agencies. Through these representations, Tempo intended to warn government and related agencies that the acts of terror kept happening due to lack of coordination among government agencies responsible for national security. Tempo also wanted to show its readers, as part of public’s right to know, what the Indonesian government had done in managing the terror attacks.

These representations are evidence in some of Tempo news features such as Setelah nirwana terbakar [After Nirvana Burnt], (No. 34/XXXI/21-27 October 2002), Amrozi Dicokok, Ba`asyir Tergeret? [Amrozi arrested, Ba`asyir next?] (No. 37/XXXI/11 - 17 November 2002), Simpul ‘syahid’ sang imam [Imam’s syahid knot] (No. 39/XXXII/25 November-1 December 2002) (the Bali bombing); Akhir pelarian Hambali [End run of Hambali] (No. 25/XXXII/18-24 August 2003), Mereka-reka otak pelumat Marriott [Guessing the destroyer of Marriott] (No. 24/XXXII/11-17 August 2003), Mengendus bomber berlogat Melayu [Discovering a Malay bomber] (No. 37/XXXII/10-16 November 2003) (the Marriott hotel bombing); Doktor bom dari bilik-bilik gelap [A bombing PhD from dark rooms] (No. 30/XXXIII/20-26 September 2004), Satu jejak bom Kuningan [A clue of Kuningan bombing] (No. 31/XXXII/27 September-03 Oktober 2004) (the Australian embassy bombing).

Of the three bombing events, Tempo gave more coverage on the issue of the investigation process conducted by the police in the 2002 Bali bombing. It is because the 2002 Bali bombing was the first bombing event that had killed many foreigners, especially Australians. Therefore, how the security apparatus dealt with this issue would invite international attention. The bombing also marks
the shift of JI’s attack with its main objective to destroy western or related interests and to establish khilafah Islamiyah (Islamic entity). Further, this issue is interesting in relation to Tempo’s attempt to portray the work of Indonesian police after separation from the Indonesian army (TNI) in 1999. News items describing the investigation process read as follows:

After Nirvana Burnt

Who the perpetrators of Bali bombing are remain dark. Officers face difficulty to investigate witnesses.

...The police still have no leads regarding the bombing perpetrators. They have launched a big operation called “Great Bali Operation” with 30 days operational target. Around 5,515 Indonesian police personals involves in the operation. Not to mention foreign intelligent force helping the team. At this time, Indonesia receives help from 11 American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, 26 Australian Federal Police, 2 people from German, and 2 people from Scotland Yard, and some others from Japan, Swiss, Swedia, and Finlandia...

...The scenario of who the perpetrators are and what the motives behind the event remain unclear. Speculations spread around the issue. Western media, for instance, believes that Legian bomb was the work of Al-Qaidah cells in Indonesia. Minister of Defence Matori Abdul Djailil also accused Usamah bin Ladin network was behind the bombing. “It is based on the intelligence information that I have received,” he said. On the contrary, radical Islamists believed that the tragedy was only the work of Western intelligence to destroy the image of Islam. The police had made some possibilities: from act of Islamic radical movement to drug syndicate war. None can be proven though... (No. 34/XXXI/21-27 October 2002).

Amrozi arrested, Ba’asyir next?
The police believe Amrozi is the Bali bombing perpetrator. But his relation with Ba’asyir and international terror movement still need to prove.

Amrozi is not an ordinary prisoner. According to the police, he is the main actor and one of the Bali bombing perpetrators that killed 186 people and wounded more than 200 people. The Police announced Amrozi as the suspect. He is the suspect of act of terror that the world considered as the most devastating event after World Trade Centre tragedy in New York, United States of America, 11 September last year.

The fugitive had been caught. The police looked happy. This was the first time the police was able to capture a person in the case of Bali bombing and was immediately labelled as suspect. Before, the police was unsure with the involvement of those arrested. Mainly they were Temporarily under investigation, but eventually released and was labelled “possible suspect”...

From the suspect’s house, the police found some evident. Among them were a plastic bag of brown hung, a plastic bag of white crystal, a plastic bag of white powder, a passport, a photo album, and a white Toyota Crown car with a license plate number G 8488 B. Further, the police also confiscated five tires and a car seat of L-300, a mini bus to be used to carry the explosive materials that destroyed Legian area...

After his second marriage failed, he went to Malaysia and became a coolie there. The police accused Amrozi, during his stay in the neighbouring state, to have built relation with radical Islamists that is now called as Jemaah Islamiyah. “He also has travelled around Singapore and Thailand,” said a police officer. During the investigation, the police said that Amrozi knew Hambali and Imam Samudra - two suspects behind Christmas bombing two years ago. Amrozi even said that Bali bombing was directly led by Imam (No. 37/XXXI/11 - 17 November 2002).

Tracing Malay bombers
Dr. Azahari and Noordin M. Top’s tracks were hardly traced. Their cellular phone signals could not be located. What were their friends’ confessions?
A police official kept looking at his notebook on the table. On the screen, there were two faces of main suspects that must be captured either dead or alive: Azahari bin Husain, a man with thick glasses, and Noordin Mohammad Top. This official with civilian cloth never felt bored staring at the two Malaysians who were accused for masterminding the bombings in Bali last year and JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, early in August this year. Sitting at a hotel lobby, we could see a small gun hiding in his leg.

These hunters kept tracing their main suspects from villages in Lembang, North Bandung, up to the hill area in Gunung Batu, which was difficult to walk through. It was because the Chief of West Java Police Headquarter, Inspector General Dadang Garnida, said that the two terrorists were possibly still in West Java province. It was in this area that the cellular phones’ signals of Dr Azahari, age 45, and Noordin, age 33, were last detected before they escaped from the police ambush, in a house on Kebon Kembang street, Tamansari, Bandung, on Thursday two weeks ago...

Chief of Indonesian police, General Da’i Bachtiar, had another analysis. According to the former Chief of East Java Police Headquarter, it was possible that both Azahari and Noordin aka Isa were now in the area with the same culture. Moreover these two neighbouring citizens could not leave their Malay accent.

The analysis from the top person in the Indonesian Police force was based on some arguments. In Sumatra, Azahari successfully deceived the police and was disguised for nearly eight months. The mastermind of the bombings on Legian street, Kuta, Bali and closed to the American Consulate in Renon, Denpasar on 12 October 2002 was traced by the police after a member of this terrorist group, Idris aka Gembrot, was arrested in Medan, last July. It was from him that the police received confirmed information: one of Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Malaysian Mujahidin Group) leaders which were hunted by the then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, kept changing places (No. 37/XXXII/10 - 16 November 2003).

In the first and third news feature above, Tempo portrayed the difficulty the security apparatus faced to uncover the mastermind behind the bombings. The help that came from some foreign intelligence indicates how the Indonesian government was not ready to manage terrorism. In the early 2000, Indonesian government denied the existence of terrorism in Indonesia, moreover on the accusation that there were radical Islamic groups who had adopted method of violence to establish khilafah Islamiyah (Islamic entity). Tempo further portrayed how each party within community and international world seemed to have its own opinion on the issue. This portrayal represents how the bombing had created chaos within community as well as government and raised accusation one another. Implicitly, Tempo wanted to remain the security apparatus to seriously investigate and arrest the perpetrators in order to give certain condition to public. The reporting of all parties that commented on the issue also signifies how Tempo attempted to accommodate their opinions in the reporting.

Interestingly, in the second news feature, Tempo described the success of police investigation team in arresting one of the suspected perpetrators of Bali bombing. It constructed the news feature by chronologically reported the arresting process and how the police finally came up with the suspect name. This reporting was meant to inform public the progress the police had made following the bombing. Nevertheless, through its editorial within the same edition as the news feature published (No. 37/XXXIII/11 - 17 November 2002), Tempo warned the police not to give misleading information to public considering the arrest of suspected perpetrators as follow:

[When the arrest of Amrozi was first broadcasted on television on last Wednesday during daytime, head of public relations division of East Java Police Headquarter denied the news later in the afternoon...This denial was confusing as the arrest information came from the police news source.]

---

Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi, Volume 8, Nomor 1, Januari - April 2010
Nonetheless, since last Thursday afternoon, the arrest and the determination of suspect status toward Amrozi were admitted by the Chief of Indonesian Police, General Da’i Bachtiar, exactly the same as reported the day before... Some people suspected that this misinformation-misleading explanation to create certain effects had been purposely launched by the police. The goals of this technique were never explained. This misinformation, which principally equals to simply lying, could bring negative impacts to many parties, and could be embarrassing when exposed.]

The representation of the investigation process as shown through the news features above represents the professional journalistic practice of Tempo news magazine. Why? It is because within the context of media-government relationship, Tempo has long history with the government where the news weekly magazine had ever been banned twice. Nonetheless, Tempo had taken a legal way to lodge the lawsuit against the government via court. Apart from the fact that Tempo finally failed to win the case, this issue indicates how Tempo as part of its vision to build society that put respect on opinion difference—had professionally taken the issue via court instead of rallied on the street protesting the ban.

The same case can also be seen via news features above. Tempo portrayed the police attempt to investigate the bombing and the police success to capture the perpetrators behind the bomb. With the adoption of in-depth and investigative news gathering technique and the implementation of news feature writing, Tempo was able to detail the information both during the investigation process as well as the capture process of the bombing perpetrators. Considering its history with the New Order government, Tempo could have given small portion of reporting of the police success in capturing the bombing perpetrators. This is why Tempo has been regarded as one of the most read news magazine (AC Nielsen 1999 and 2002) in Indonesia and has been the trusted news sources to many of its readers. Thus, Tempo is truly a news media institution that employs a professional journalistic practice.

This issue of investigation process is also crucial to report so that public and especially international world knew to what extent the Indonesian government seriously managed these acts of terrorism and assured that this kind of event would not happen again in the future. Within Tempo’s perspective, the reporting of the investigation process as well as the arresting of the perpetrators of the bombing were part of public’s right to know. In times of confusion, uncertainty and threatened feeling, public requires reliable information. Furthermore, the three bombing events occurred within the dynamic social and political conditions in the early reformation era where Indonesia was still searching its new way to a democratic state. That was why public needed information sources that can be trusted and news media like Tempo became one of them. As stated in its mission, Tempo wants to be a news media that “is independent, free from capital owner and political pressures.”

It is what the Pew Centre for Civic Journalism called as civic journalism, which is “a belief that journalism has an obligation to public life—an obligation that goes beyond just telling the news or unloading lots of fact. The way we do our journalism affects the way public life goes. Journalism can help empower a community or it can help disable it” (Itule & Anderson, 2003, p.12). Tempo had been able to demonstrate a professional implementation of journalism rather than to be a simple publication.

In relation to the freedom of the press in the era of ‘reform’, Tempo did not experience any significant changes in its editorial policy which was just like in the era of New Order repressive regime. It was because it had adopted a liberal way of reporting based on principles of fairness, check and balance, independent, and accuracy since its establishment. These principles were further adjusted with the social and political conditions within the country. Nonetheless, it doesn’t mean that Tempo did not face any challenges in this era of ‘reform’. As described in research VI, Tempo had to deal with some challenges from particular groups within society that principally against the freedom of the press. Tempo’s consistent reporting had led this magazine to receive some acknowledgments.
Edgements from some institutions such as Best Cover from Asia Publishing Congress, Singapore in 1986 and Medal of Honour from Missouri School of Journalism, United States in 2004.

Tempo’s liberal and critical reporting toward government, for instance, can be seen in the news feature Ketika nirvana terbakar [After nirvana burnt] as follows,

After Nirvana Burnt

Who the perpetrators of Bali bombing are remains dark. Officers face difficulty to investigate witnesses.

...Instead of solving the case, military and police quarreled against each other. A police from the Bali Police headquarter admitted that he did not get good result when investigating a witness from the military. “There is a pressure from military officials not to prolong the investigation on them”, said the source. On the other hand, military police commander of Bali region, Colonel Pranoto, denied the fact. However, he said, “What the use to investigate if it only worsens the condition? Moreover all investigation must first obtain permission from the commander. All must go through me.” He in turn insulted the police for working slowly and carelessly. “They have no sense of crisis,” he said...(No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002).

This paragraph was placed at the end of the news feature that became the main story in the edition a week after the 2002 Bali bombing. Through this representation, Tempo criticised the conflict that occurred between the police and the military which may hamper the investigation process. Tempo had deep concern that the separation and bigger role of the police from the military may create obstacles, just as in the investigation process of the bombing. Since the separation in 1999, the police have been given the responsibility for internal security, whereas external defence remains the domain of the military. Unfortunately, the division process was not followed with the enhancement of the police capacity which was shown by the slow response to the terrorism attack. The military, on the other hand, considered that counter-terrorism and intelligence should have been part of its role. This “grey area” has resulted in the increasing gap between the military and the police (see ICG No.90/2004). And Tempo implicitly portrayed this issue through the above paragraph. It can conclude that as part of its role as the fourth estate, Tempo played its social control function toward the state by criticizing the conflict that occurred between the police and the military.

Another important issue that Tempo critically portrayed and can be categorised in the investigation process was how officials or ministers within governmental structure had accused one another to be responsible for what happened in Bali. News feature exhibiting this issue appeared as follows,

Accusing one another in managing Legian

Hundreds of people died in Legian, Cabinet members quarrelled. Why did the government seem slow in handling the case?

...In a cabinet meeting the following day, the issue of how to manage the tragedy was nearly not included in the agenda. In a meeting at the Presidential Palace attended by all cabinet members, a quarrel occurred between Vice President Hamzah Haz and some ministers whom he accused did not do anything in managing the case.

Whilst showing a news research, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said he felt offended with what Hamzah Haz had said. “Frankly, we are offended with Vice President’s statement who said that we were only NATO (no action, talk only). We had worked hard, but why we were embarrassed such a way outside,” Susilo protested.

It was his fellow worker in politics and security, head of the State Intelligence Agency, A.M. Hendropriyono, gave his comment. He also criticized Hamzah Haz’s statement in the newsresearchs. According to Hendro, a vice president should have not issued such a statement.

Mega (President) who led the meeting remained silent. She did not do anything to neutralize the tension. That was why the tension raised when Hamzah replied the two retired generals. This quarrel was nearly unstoppable if Minister Jusuf Kalla did not talk to Susilo.
not to be provoked by Hamzah’s answer. Consequently, the meeting meant to find the solution on how to handle the bombing last for five hours. It finished at three o’clock in the afternoon. Fortunately, the meeting agreed that government would implement government regulation as the replacement of act on antiterrorism... (No. 34/XXXI/21 - 27 October 2002).

Through this news feature Tempo explicitly criticized Megawati’s government incompetency in handling the act of terror. It is signified by the quarrel between the vice president, who before the bombing strictly against the possibility of the existence of terrorists from radical Islamic group in Indonesia, and minister of defence and head of state intelligence agency. After the bombing occurred, he accused that security apparatus-intelligence and the police-were responsible for what had happened in Bali.

The news feature above again proved the high quality of Tempo in depth reporting where its journalists could obtain information and chronology of the cabinet meeting. And, as one of Tempo’s editorial board said,

With its weekly news magazine format has made it possible for Tempo journalists to spend days, weeks, and even perhaps months, researching a compelling topic and then writing in depth. You could hardly see Tempo journalists attended a press conference. We will meet the source after or before the press conference to obtain different perspective as well as information presented in the press conference (name to be anonymous, interview held in Jakarta, 2006).

The portrayal of the issue above was to give Tempo’s readers a description of how Megawati’s government was not ready in dealing with terrorism. This was proven with the issuance of government regulation as the replacement of act on antiterrorism, after the terrorist bomb exploded in Legian which claimed hundreds of life, which some of them were foreigners; whereas since the year 2000, several bombings had occurred in Indonesia, but no action was taken seriously to prevent terrorists from continuously launched their acts of terror in Indonesia. The slow response of Megawati’s government toward terrorism events had politically affected her image in the 2004 general election. Tempo even made polling at the end of 2002 regarding government performance in dealing with terrorism, and the result was no shocking where 70.14 % of respondents felt threatened with act of terrorism.

It then can be concluded that Tempo had fairly reported the investigation process where it reported not only the obstacles the police had to face in finding the bombing perpetrators, but also the success of the police in arresting suspected perpetrators. Nonetheless, as part of its role as the fourth estate, Tempo also criticized the government for not seriously managing the terror events and tended to be reactive instead of proactive. The next issue discusses the final issue that became Tempo’s main focus attention of the portrayal of bombing events in Indonesia.

The Disclosure of Terrorist Network

The third issue related to Tempo’s representation of recent terrorist events was the disclosure of terrorist network in Indonesia. Although placed as the third issue in this study, this issue can be considered to have received Tempo’s extensive reportage. It can be seen from not least than ten editions and more than a hundred news features of Tempo news magazine, ranging from 2002 to 2004 bombing events. Some arguments can be proposed from the representation of this issue in Tempo news magazine. First, as the most populous Muslim country in the world, Indonesia had been accused as the terrorist haven. Secondly, some radical groups had used Islamic values to justify their acts of terror through the adoption of method of violence to reach their goals. As the consequence, Islam had been associated with religion that legitimised violence.

As the media that claimed to be the representation of society, Tempo felt it was its obligation to report the news that was written fairly and balance. Through the representation of this issue, Tempo attempted to show to its readers the terrorist network that had been related with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. Further, it attempted to give
the background as well as to end the debate that rapidly grew within community concerning Islam, radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia.

Of the three bombing events, *Tempo* gave more coverage of the terrorist network post 2002 Bali bombing. Why? It is because Bali bombing was the first terrorist attack, according to some analysts, related to western interest; also, the accusation from international world that the attack had been launched by radical Islamists. Therefore, *Tempo* employed indepth and investigative reporting to disclose the terrorist network. The investigative reporting had involved tens of *Tempo* journalists and correspondents from some places in Indonesia as well as in other countries such as Thailand and the United States. Some news features relate to this issue include Jejak Ba’asyir di Sungai Manggis [Ba’asyir’s trace in Manggis river], Perjalanan seorang Ngruki dua [Journey of the second Ngruki] (No. 35/XXXI/28 October-3 November 2002), Balada sang pendakwah di Negeri Sembilan [Balad of the preacher in Negeri Sembilan] (No. 36/XXXI/4-10 November 2002), Al-Islam yang mendadak tenar [Al-Islam’s sudden famous] (No. 37/XXXI/ 11-17 November 2002), Simpal ‘syahid’ sang Imam [Imam’s syahid knot] (No. 39/XXXI/25 November-1 December 2002), Jihad Al-Mukmin sampai ke kantin (No. 40/XXXI/02-08 December 2002) (the Bali bombing); Desainer bom yang paling dicari [Most wanted bomb designer] (No. 26/XXXI/25-31 August 2003), Upaya menjerat Dr. Azahari (No. 27/ XXXI/25-31 August 2003) (the JW Marriott Hotel bombing); Doktor bom dari bilik-bilik gelap [Bomb doctor from dark rooms] (No. 30/ XXXII/20-26 September 2004). The emphasis on the disclosure of terrorist network was evident in *Tempo* news features as follows:

**Journey of the second Ngruki**

*Ngruki was a homeland to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. From that place, he started his life as a hard line Islamic preacher.*

..The establishment of Al-Mukmin Islamic School (pesantren) derived from 30 minute noon prayer lectures at the Surakarta Great Mosque. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar usually preached in turn...

Since then, the Islamic school developed rapidly. At the moment, the school had approximately 2,000 students from all over Indonesia. As the founder, Ba’asyir wrote a book that became the guidance in the school. The title was Tarbiyah Islamiyah and was used by year seven students. In the school, the students were taught the understanding of the necessity to uphold Syari’ah Islam (Islamic law) as the rule of life. “Upholding syari’ah Islam widely is impossible to do without power. Studying akidah (at Al-Mukmin) means understand the essential of political Islam” said Muhammad Nursalim, a researcher of IAIN Yogyakarta who wrote a thesis about Al-Mukmin.

...Suspicion toward Sungkar and Ba’asyir came to its peak after the 1977 general election. At that time, Golok won and the government was increasingly aware of radical Islamic movement. Sungkar and Ba’asyir were suspected to intentionally establish Indonesia Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia or NII). It was said that Ba’asyir had joined Haji Ismail Pranoto, the leader of NII in Central Java. The issue, however, was denied by Ba’asyir...(No. 35/XXXI/28 October-3 November 2002).

**Imam’s syahid knot**

It was no mistake when Abdul Aziz chose his alias as Imam Samudra. His calmness was as wide as an ocean. When shown to journalists last Friday, one day after arrested by the police, he appeared calmly. Wearing black t-shirt with a brand of a sport product from America, the country he hated, his gaze wipe around tens of people’s eyes and cameras that stared at him...

The ‘calm’ appearance of Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra alias Kudama and other aliases had invited controversial stories. “He confessed to have planned the Bali bombing,” said Chief of Indonesian Police, General Da’i Bachtiar. Public could soon believe that Imam with a “cool” face was a cruel terrorist; unlike when the police captured Amrozi, the playboy from Tenggulun, Lamongan, East Java...
Imam admitted that he learned jihad and military skill in Afghanistan for two and half years. He learned how to use M-16 and AK-47 weapons and how to set mines. He went to Afghanistan after finishing his study at Madrasah Aliyah Negeri (equals to senior high school) in Serang, Banten... Imam really had a full confident. He believed that he was untouchable. He even took his wife and children in the terrorist operation that he called as jihad. The risk of death was put aside for the sake of syahid with heaven as the repayment. That was what Iqbal had done, his friend who carried suicide bomb that destroyed Paddy’s Café. “It was the real peak of syahid,” said Abdul Aziz to the police officer who interrogated him (No. 39/XXXI/25 Nov - 01 Des 2002).

**Bomb ghost from Johor**

Nobody could understand why Azahari bin Husin could turn into the most frightening bomb ghost in Southeast Asia. It was because since he was young, very little clues led to the radicalism of this math genius. It was suspected that the cause must have left deeply in the life of the 46 years old professor, so that he decided to join in a militant Islamic group and travelled across Afghanistan and Philippines. Azahari went to Australia for four years in the end of 1970s, when most of Malaysian students preferred to study political Islam as the impact of Islamic revolution in Iran. However, none of radical or religious groups had invited Azahari’s interest. “He never join the groups” said a Malaysian police officer. After returned to Malaysia, Azahari and his wife taught at the Malaysia University of Technology in Skudai, Johor... At that time he even hadn’t shown strong Islamic sentiment. Malaysian intelligence suspected that the change occurred in mid 1990s when he often attended the recitation of the Quran held by the late Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.

...First, the police thought that the sick of his wife after birth giving his second child would be the catalyst of change within Azahari. What happened was the other way around. He went to Afghanistan and southern Philippines at the end of 1990s. “It was since in the Philippines that he became obsessed with bomb making” said a Malaysian security official.

“He was like a re-born Muslim” said a Malaysian police source. It was quite different from other followers of Jemaah Islamiyyah network who mostly came from villages and obtained their Islamic teaching through Islamic boarding school (No. 27/XXXII/01 - 07 September 2003).

The three news features above principally discuss two significant issues in relation to the disclosure of the terrorist network: pesantren (Islamic boarding school) and suspected bombing perpetrators. Why are these two issues? It is because some Islamic boarding schools had been accused for teaching radical and narrow understanding of Islamic values and the perpetrators of acts of terror were pesantren graduates. Shuja (in TerrorismMonitor 2005), in his report, identified five pesantren (Islamic boarding school) include al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Sukohardjo in Solo, al-Muttaquien in Jepara (Central Java), Dar us-Syahadah in Boyolali (Central Java) and al-Islam in Lamongan (East Java). He claimed that alumni network of pesantren graduates were important element within the terrorist structure. The recorded confessions of perpetrators of Bali II suicide bombings in October 2005 indicate how young men of pesantren, with their narrow understanding of the meaning of jihad, believed that what they did was to wage jihad and that they would go straight to heaven after death.

All these accusation, added with the coverage of western news media that had associated Islam with violence, had created uncertainty within community, even government. Nevertheless, it can’t be denied that there were particular groups who had adopted and misused Islamic teachings for their political ends. Thus, as part of its role to inform public of the real condition following the bombing events and to reduce uncertainty, Tempo felt it was necessary to report the issue.

The three news features explicitly highlight pesantren Al-Mumin in Ngruki, Solo, Central Java.
led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir; Imam Samudra who had been accused to have planned the Bali bombing attack; and Azahari who expert in making bomb. By placing all the news features above as main cover stories for several editions, Tempo had been attempting to uncover the terrorist network. Nonetheless, Tempo carefully named the group who launched the attack as Jemaah Islamiyah. Even four months after the 2002 Bali bombing, in its end year edition, Tempo still did not dare to use the name Jemaah Islamiyah, but uncover how the name had come to surface.

In the case of first news feature (Journey of the second Ngruki); Tempo portrayed the internal condition of Al-Mukmin Islamic Boarding School (pesantren) established by the late Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Tempo brought this issue to surface because both founders and the school were believed to have taught radical understanding of Islam to its students. Furthermore, some perpetrators of act of terror were Al-Mukmin graduates. This condition had created an opinion as if this pesantren had produced terrorist graduates. Therefore, Tempo reported this issue as part of its role to fulfil public’s right to know and to reduce uncertainty and anxiety within community. Nevertheless, Tempo tried to be neutral in its reporting. Consequently, the meaning of the news feature can be comprehended as follow:

It is true that Ba’asyir had implemented hard discipline at the Al-Mukmin Islamic Boarding School in Ngruki, Solo. The students were taught the necessity of understanding Islamic law as the way of life, but none of the teaching material related to terrorism. The late Abdullah Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s preach, since the early establishment of the school, tended to criticize government who they considered as secular government. This had made the New Order government, at that time, classified both to have involved in the establishment of Indonesian Islamic State (NII). Implicitly, however, Tempo did not find any direct link between the school and the so called Jemaah Islamiyah.

Within Tempo perspective, this representation was necessary to avoid misjudgement and generalisation of pesantren to be the place for Muslim radicalisation. Also, to report the case of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir based on the principle of fair and balance, without having to get involved in the issue.

The second and third news features portrayed the profiles of Imam Samudra and Dr. Azahari. Imam Samudra was, based on his claim, the planner of the 2002 Bali bombing and Dr. Azahari was expertise in bomb making. The reporting of the profiles of these suspects was evidence of Tempo’s attempt to disclosure the terrorist network. The news features were constructed through in depth reporting style that involved investigation process conducted by the reporter.

The representation of the second and third news features signify the fact that terrorists existed and lived among society. The reporting of Imam Samudra’s profile, for instance, was published after the police was able to arrest the man based on the confession of Amrozi, the first Bali bombing suspects that had already been arrested. This representation was mean to inform public that there were groups within society who had misused Islamic values (such as jihad) and had adopted method of violence to justify their acts of terror. Samudra’s calm and confident appearance in front of journalists, but confessed to be the planner of the Bali bombing shocked public who since the bombing were under uncertainty as there had been growing debate whether there were radical groups in Indonesia.

The similar understanding can also be employed to the third news feature portraying Dr. Azahari. The reporting of this bomb expert who originally came from Malaysia may have become a proof that there was a terrorist network that span along some Southeast Asian countries (see ICG No.63/2004). Therefore, the government of these countries need to work together in combating terrorism.

Implicitly, Tempo gave its complement to the police for being able to arrest those who were suspected to be the perpetrators of acts of terror, but at the same time warned that terrorism would always be a threat to the national security, existing government as well as society. The warning could be analysed from the reporting of the dangerous
of Azahari as a bomb expert—before finally shoot to dead in early November 2005—and Samudra’s statement in the last paragraph who said that suicide bombing was the true peak of jihad.

In general, textual analysis yields some interesting findings in relation to the Tempo’s representation of the disclosure of the terrorist network was meant to inform public that terrorists existed and lived among society and had become an imminent threat to Indonesia’s national security that had just entered the era of ‘reform’. The detailed description of al-Mukmin Islamic boarding school and two suspected terrorists was to provide Tempo’s readers with information needed to make judgement under uncertainty condition. It was able to play its role as the story teller and stayed independent in the issue. With the form as a news magazine that is published weekly, Tempo had adopted in-depth reporting and written the news in the form of feature to give different way of news reporting.

Conclusion

Tempo’s libertarian and critical reporting style has made it a leading newsmagazine in Indonesia. Its past history with the New Order government—Tempo was banned twice—indicates how the news magazine would report the news considered important to public, regardless of the consequences. In relation to the representation of terrorism, Tempo principally adopted fair, check and balanced, cover both sides’ principles. Actuality, in-depth and accuracy in reporting represent Tempo’s strong and independent editorial policy.

The representations of three bombing events in Tempo’s news magazine had been constructed through cultural and political perspectives. These can be analysed from the representation of the investigation process conducted by the police, and the disclosure of the terrorist network. Principally, the selection of issue of investigation process was to inform the public of the progress the police had done regarding the acts of terror. This was meant to create comfort and safe feelings within society. It was clear that uncertainty condition arise following the bombings. Politically, it had to admit that the way Megawati’s government handled the 2002 Bali bombing had contributed to the decrease of her reputation in the 2004 general election. This was signified by the quarrel between vice president and minister of defence.

In the last representation, Tempo carefully reported the suspected terrorist network, Jemaah Islamiyah. Nonetheless, Tempo carefully used the term. It was meant to avoid a judgement as if Islam— as the dominant religion embraced by Indonesian society—identical with terrorism activities. Tempo attempted to inform as well as to educate public that there were groups within society that had misused Islamic values for their acts of terror.

In sum, Tempo’s representation of terrorism had been delivered through a professional practice of journalism. It played the role as the story teller and stayed neutral from the conflict. At the same time, it can be said that Tempo had played its role as the fourth estate with its critical reporting toward the way the government managed the issue. Thus, Tempo’s vision to be ‘the guidance in the process of enhancing people’s freedom of thought and expression and to build society that appreciates smartness and difference of opinion’ was realised through the publication of reliable new media.

Bibliography

Allan, S., 2000, News Culture, Buckingham: Open University Press.
Company profile of PT Tempo Inti Media tbk, 2006.
Nacos, B. L., 2002, Mass-mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Maryland,
Textual Analysis of Tempo News Magazine


Tempo, Setelah nirvana terbakar [After nirvana burnt], No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oktober 2002.


______, Mereka-reka otak pelumat Marriott [Guessing the destroyer of Marriott], No. 24/XXXII/11-17 Agustus 2003.


______, Doktor bom dari bilik-bilik gelap [A bombing PhD from dark rooms] (No. 30/XXXIII/20-26 September 2004).

